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ABSTRACT
Plain packaging, a new tobacco control tool being considered by a growing number of countries,
mandates the removal of all attractive and promotional aspects of tobacco product packages. As a result
of plain packaging, the only authorized feature remaining on a tobacco package is the brand name,
displayed in a standardized font, size, color, and location on the package. At issue is the meaning of “use”
of trademarks on plain packaging, and whether plain packaging amounts to the creation of an invalid
encumbrance. The tobacco industry and other regulated sectors (including wine, fast-food, and
pharmaceuticals) also believe that plain packaging jeopardizes trademark rights and contravenes certain
Constitutional provisions. In particular, they argue that governments do, and are, in fact, capable of
“acquiring,” property, or that governments could be construed as “taking” property on unjust terms,
contrary to Constitutional guarantees. The tobacco industry’s efforts to fight plain packaging in the
courts have, however, proven futile thus far—particularly in Australia.
This article, after introducing the reader to the dawn and rationale of plain packaging from a quasilegal and marketing perspective, examines the compatibility of normative arguments for plain packaging
within the international framework for trademark protection (as preserved in the TRIPS Agreement). It
then looks at the way in which these arguments and that framework have shaped the constitutional
validity of plain packaging of tobacco products in the United States and Australia.
In drawing on these jurisdictions that, alongside the European Union, incorporate rather aggressive
tobacco control legislation, this paper highlights the nuanced geographic and legal contexts that
complicate global regulatory control, which play an important role in advancing global public health in the
face of trade-related objections. Finally, this paper proposes methods for dealing with current legal
challenges to global tobacco control regulations and suggests that there are strong arguments to deny
private entities that seek to establish a successful case by purporting to invalidate plain packaging
legislation.
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COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES IN TRADEMARK LAW: CHALLENGING
THE INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PLAIN
PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
SARAH A. HINCHLIFFE*
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, a packet of cigarettes came with a glitzy logo, rich foil sleeves,
and romantic language describing the pleasures within. But ever since it was
scientifically proven that smoking harms your health, legislators around the world
have tried to curb cigarette marketing on the grounds of public health.1 Tobacco
manufacturers, on the contrary, try to undermine this activity.
The newest trend in tobacco control policy is a concept known as “plain
packaging,” a mandatory standardized package with a certain appearance containing
large health warnings.2 The use of items such as trademarks and logos is not
allowed.3 Canada was the first country to try to introduce plain packaging in 1994;
that effort failed primarily due to concerns regarding the trademark rights of the
tobacco manufacturers—not to mention violations of international obligations.4
* © Sarah A. Hinchliffe 2013. Harvard University (Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School);
Boston University (Visiting Scholar, School of Law); University of Melbourne (Fellow and Specialist
(Teaching), Department of Accounting); Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of Australia and
the Supreme Court of Victoria. For their insightful comments, the author thanks academic
members of the Harvard Law School, including Professor Michael Stein and Professor William
Alford; academic members of the Boston University School of Law, including Professor Michael
Meurer; academic members of the William S. Boyd School of Law, including Professor Mary
LaFrance, and Professor Marketa Trimble; and Professor Mark Davison whose insight and opinions
are acknowledged in this article.
1 See Michael Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control, Review of an Emerging Public
Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858, 858 (1997) (documenting the “effort to reduce morbidity and
mortality caused by tobacco products”); Jonathan Nadel et al., Disparities in Global Tobacco Harm
Reduction, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2120, 2120 (2005) (comparing the “rigorous tobacco control
measures” in the United States with varying efforts by different Asian countries); Lawrence O.
Gostin, Global Regulatory Strategies for Tobacco Control, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2057, 2057 (2007)
(commenting on regulatory efforts to curb tobacco use in North America and Western Europe).
2 Look What They’ve Done to my Brands: Cigarette-Makers Will Weather the Spread of Plain
Nov.
17,
2012,
available
at
Packaging
Laws,
ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21566682-cigarette-makers-will-weather-spread-plainpackaging-laws-look-what-theyve-done-my/print. It is to be noted that tobacco control comprises
numerous facets. In this regard, “plain packaging” is to be distinguished from requirements (albeit
statutory) to place certain health warnings on tobacco products. While both may raise issues of
commercial freedoms imposed on tobacco companies, the former (and indeed the focus in this article)
may be described as imposing a narrower restriction.
3 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 20 (Austl.) [hereinafter TPPA 2011].
4 PHYSICIANS FOR SMOKE-FREE CAN., THE PLOT AGAINST PLAIN PACKAGING 2, 35–37 (2008),
available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1%27.pdf. At present,
there have been numerous complaints submitted to the World Trade Organization concerning the
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act. See WTO Dispute Settlement Summary, Australia—Certain
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The plain packaging efforts in Australia is more successful. Much to the dismay
of tobacco manufacturers and related entities, cigarette packaging in Australia is not
pretty: brand names must be printed in a uniform font on a dull, olive-brown
background, with large, graphic images of gangrenous limbs and diseased internal
organs.5 The High Court of Australia recently upheld the Plain Packaging Act,
creating a globally significant legal precedent that supports plain packaging from a
constitutional law perspective and that recognizes the nature of intellectual property
rights.6
While most doctrinal contributions on the subject of tobacco plain packaging
have focused on the complex interplay between tobacco control and trade and the
linkage between tobacco control and investment treaty guarantees,7 there has been
little written on the intersection of public rights and private property rights under
Constitutional mandates and international treaties.
This article considers the approaches to plain packaging legislation in two
distinct, but relatively active jurisdictions with respect to health policy, Australia
Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products
and
Packaging,
DS434
(Complainant:
Ukraine),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013); WTO
Dispute Settlement Summary, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, DS441 (Complainant: Dominican Republic), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds441_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013); WTO Dispute Settlement
Summary, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and
Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging DS435
(Complainant: Honduras), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 22, 2013).
5 See generally TPPA 2011, supra note 3, s 19(2) (mandating plain packaging of tobacco by Dec.
1, 2012). The Bill passed through the House of Representatives in late August and the Senate on
November 10, 2011. Press Release, Austl. Minister for Health & Ageing, Senate Passes World First
Plain
Packaging
of
Tobacco
Legislation
(Nov.
10,
2011),
available
at
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/52869225DE7EE77BCA257944
0077F9BE/$File/NR238.pdf.
6 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (2012) HCA 43, 45–46 (Austl.).
7 See generally Jeffrey Drope & Raphael Lencucha, Tobacco Control and Trade Policy:
Proactive Strategies for Integrating Policy Norms, 34 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 153, 154–55 (2013),
available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jphp/journal/v34/n1/full/jphp201236a.html (arguing
that trade does not necessarily always win over tobacco control following the World Health
Organization’s 2005 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control); Benn McGrady, Trade
Liberalisation and Tobacco Control: Moving from a Policy of Exclusion Towards a More
Comprehensive Policy, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 280, 280 (2007) (explaining how trade liberalization
endangers effective tobacco control and heightens consumption); Ellen R. Shaffer et. al.,
International Trade Agreements: A Threat to Tobacco Control Policy, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL
(SUPPLEMENT II) ii19, ii19 (2005) available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/14/
suppl_2/ii19.full (discussing the deleterious effect of trade agreements on human rights and health
through the promotion of tobacco use and the protection of the tobacco industry); Matthew C.
Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will Investor-State Arbitration Send
Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing up in Smoke?, Investment Treaty News, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-willinvestor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/
(exploring
the
international investment issues arising from Philip Morris’ challenge to Uruguay’s tobacco
regulations).
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and the United States. It seeks to clarify the prevalence of conceded arguments that
adequately challenge the normative, constitutional, and legal validity of legislation
introducing plain packaging laws. Part I introduces normative themes, including the
prevalence of property-rights’ recognition and an economic rights perspective with
respect to trademark law. It is argued that this, in turn, precipitates legal
arguments both in support of and against plain packaging of tobacco products. Part
II then outlines the state of international law, including the quashing of imposts
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights8 and
the Paris Convention.9 In so outlining, this paper emphasizes the need for
governments and policy makers to understand the meaning, context, and scope of
“use,” particularly in the context of trademark law, prior to drafting legislation that
purports to limit, place, displace, or create certain statutory obligations on
manufacturers and retailers with respect to plain packaging.10 Part III analyzes the
premise and validity, both from a legal and normative perspective, of plain packaging
laws as purporting to fall within constitutional mandates and within the scope of
international law and obligations outlined in Part II. Additionally, this portion of the
paper identifies the rift between domestic, i.e., constitutional mandates, and
international obligations that have impacted, and no doubt will continue to impact,
the successful implementation of plain packaging legislation. Australia and the
United States, alongside Canada and the European Union, have been active,
particularly within the last decade, in seeking to introduce tobacco control measures
and demonstrate this fissure nicely.
Despite their international obligations, governments still maintain a certain
level of discretion, albeit as signatories to or members of international obligations or
Agreements, such as those outlined in Part II, in their ability to “modify,” “impede,”
or, to a degree, “create” certain “rights,” obligations, or both, in legislation. However,
such discretion is cabined by certain constitutional rights and requirements, as well
as core objectives of a particular legal regime. In relation to the latter, the
trademark regime encompasses a property-right dichotomy between private-rights,
i.e., the registrant is the “owner” of a trademark, and public-rights, i.e., the
trademark belongs to a broader class of persons or society in general. If normative
factors in an intellectual property context are viewed widely, then it would be easier
for governments to present a successful case, at least in part, for plain packaging
legislation. Finally, Part IV outlines some recommendations for policy change, both
on an international and domestic level, that seek to put to rest discrepancies forming
the basis of a challenge to plain packaging legislation.

8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
9 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 1 Bevans 80 (revised by
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583)
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
10 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1627 n.136 (2007) (noting that the interpretation of “use” is
important to understand the meaning of “acquisition” of a trademark by a government).
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The findings in this paper have significant bearing for policy makers from an
international and domestic perspective, for marketing strategies, and for future
legislative reform.
I. PLAIN PACKAGING IN A NORMATIVE CONTEXT
“Plain packaging,” also referred to as “generic packaging,” has been described as
a novel tobacco control policy tool.11 It requires the detachment or exclusion of
trademarks, graphics, and logos from tobacco packaging, e.g., cigarette packs, other
than the brand name itself, which is displayed with simple unadorned text, i.e.,
standard font size, color, and location on the package.12
The packaging does not contain color, other than a dull olive-brown, and
includes only the content and consumer information, such as toxic constituents and
health warnings, required by law.13
In essence, plain packaging aims at
standardizing the appearance of all cigarette boxes in order to decrease their appeal,
especially to adolescents, thus reducing the prevalence and up-take of smoking.14

11 See generally Becky Freeman et al., The Case for the Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products
TOBACCO CONTROL 17 (2007), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4rz0m70k (“Plain
packaging legislation remains an important but curiously under-explored part of comprehensive
tobacco control legislation designed to eliminate all forms of tobacco advertising and promotion.”).
12 MELODIE TILSON, NON-SMOKERS’ RIGHTS ASS’N/SMOKING & HEALTH ACTION FOUND., PLAIN
PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS 119 (2008).
13 TPPA 2011, supra note 3, s 19. Note that there are various facets of the term “tobacco
control,” which incorporates regulation of marketing, display, warnings, excise requirements, and
more recently, “plain packaging.” There are several examples in Australia. See Tobacco Advertising
Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth) s 15 (Austl.) (banning almost all forms of tobacco advertising and
promotion); Trade Practices (Consumer Product Information Standards) (Tobacco) Regulations 2004
(Cth) pt 2.2, div 2.2.1 (Austl.) (outlining requirements for graphic health warnings to appear on
packaging); Trade Practices (Consumer Product Safety Standard) (Reduced Fire Risk Cigarettes)
Regulations 2008 (Cth) regs 10, 14 (Austl.) (prescribing performance standards and labeling of
cigarettes); Excise Act 1901, Excise Regulations 1925 (Cth) reg 15 (Austl.) (outlining requirements
for payment of excise on tobacco products); Excise Tariff Act 1921 (Cth) (Austl.); Customs Act 1901
(Cth) (Austl.); Customs Regulations 1926 (Cth) regs 106, 126F (Austl.); Customs Tariff Act 1995
(Cth) s 3 (Austl.) (regulating aspects of importing tobacco).
These types of regulations can also be found in the United States. See, e.g., Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 21 U.S.C.); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012)
[hereinafter FSPTCA] (regulating tobacco labeling). A number of cases adjudicating tobacco control
exist. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001); United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1105–06 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Foothills Brewing Concern, Inc. v.
City of Greenville, 660 S.E.2d 264, 266 (S.C. 2008); 23–34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of
Health, 685 F.3d 174, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that city board of health regulation requiring
tobacco retailers to display warning signs adjacent to cigarette displays was preempted); Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2012). A number of
cases outside the United States also exist. See, e.g., Case E-16/10, Philip Morris Nor. AS v. Norway,
2011 E.F.T.A. 3 (challenging a Norwegian Display ban on tobacco products under the European
Economic Agreement).
14 See generally Explanatory Memorandum, (Tobacco Plain Packaging) Bill 2011 (Cth) 1
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00128/Explanatory%20
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While there is merit in the advancement of health policy and legal reform with
respect to tobacco products,15 there exists an array of legal issues surrounding the
legal validity of plain packaging, including whether:



Plain packaging legislation violates certain constitutional rights in Australia
and the United States; and
Governments should be able to acquire certain intellectual property rights.

Prior to the legal analysis of “use” of proprietary rights, something this article
suggests is relatively settled—particularly as outlined in Articles 6, 8, and 20 of the
TRIPS Agreement16 and the validity of constitutional rights arguments raised by
tobacco companies regarding a “disposition,” “taking,” or “acquisition” of property
rights—there are some broader normative matters to consider, such as:



That justification for trademark protection now incorporates public interest
regulation, but the degree to which this is invoked may vary;17 and
Whether these factors have diminished or could, from a property-rights
analysis, diminish trademark protection generally.

Viewed together, the considerations set forth above firmly engrain the validity of
plain packaging legislation in the jurisdictions under consideration in this article,
Australia and the United States, and could extend to other jurisdictions, such as
Canada and the European Union. Going forward, therefore, there may be little scope
for tobacco companies to successfully challenge such legislation, whether that be
based on TRIPS, obligations under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), or
constitutional considerations.
To understand the breadth of legal issues at both an international level, i.e.,
WTO and the TRIPS, and domestic level, i.e., acquisition and use of proprietary
rights in the context of intellectual property law, constitutional law, consumer
protection law, and health law level, the importance of central, normative themes
concerning marketing, property rights, and economics rights analysis must first be
noted.

Memorandum/Text [hereinafter TPPB Memorandum] (explaining that the Plain Packaging Act aims
to reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco products to consumers and young people).
15 See infra Parts III.A & III.C.
16 See infra Parts III.A & III.B.
17 Lawrence O. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 6 (2d ed. 2008). “Public health law is the study of the legal powers and
duties of the state . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . . and of the limitations on
the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, . . . proprietary, and other legally protected
interests of individuals.” Id. at 4.
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A. Normative Themes in the Trademark Regime
It may be a common belief that tobacco companies, or trademark registrants
generally, have an exclusive entitlement to such proprietary rights. This is not
entirely true, depending, of course, on the way this statement is viewed.
Broadly speaking, a business enterprise has two basic functions: marketing and
innovation. These functions guide the underlying desire of an enterprise to make a
fiscal profit in the process of supplying to customers. Intellectual property plays a
role in both of these functions, and trademarks specifically are of primary importance
in the marketing process. Every product in the market faces competing products at
various marginal rates of substitution. Most economic markets are based at least on
an implicit right to differentiate a product and to promote a brand name. If this were
not the case, then all markets would become perfectly competitive, and all companies
and products would become standardized. With such standardization, consumers
would not have the opportunity to make product or market price choices.18 From an
economic perspective,19 there would be reduced incentive for innovation,
enhancement, research, and development.
There is no doubt that meeting or exceeding customers’ expectations is a
challenging task, especially when tastes and preferences continuously evolve in a
competitive marketplace, with many similar products catering to the same needs.
Only businesses rising to these challenges can expect to develop and retain a loyal
clientele. Enterprises achieve this loyalty mostly through a distinctive trade name
and one or more trademarks.20 Strong brands and successful branding, for example,
through distinct imagery, identification, and reputation, may be validated through
contributions to market share, sales, enhanced goodwill, profit margins, loyalty, and
market awareness.21
The tobacco industry is deeply entrenched; individual enterprises have invested
heavily in product differentiation, primarily through marketing pursuits. In recent
times, the wrath of governments’ regulatory discretion in the context of tobacco has
had some far-reaching consequences for tobacco enterprises. For example, many
jurisdictions now require that health warnings and safety and information standards
be affixed to tobacco products.22 For each of these jurisdictions, the goal is to improve
18 See generally Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, 99 Q.J.
ECON. 753, 753 (1984) (analyzing the issue of market power in the context of markets for
transferable property rights). See also Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property
Rights 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 14 (1964) (analyzing the problem of efficiency within the framework of
smooth running markets and governments).
19 See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined. & Error! Bookmark not defined.
(defining “economic rights” and “economic perspectives”).
20 The Role of Trademarks in Marketing, WIPO MAG., Feb. 2002, at 10 [hereinafter WIPO MAG.
2002]. Broadly speaking, “distinctiveness” means that the sign is capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from the goods or services of another undertaking. See TRIPS,
supra note 8, art. 15 (identifying “distinctiveness” as a requirement for trademark protection).
21 See Tanmay Chattopadhyay et al., Approaches to Measurement of Brand Equity, OXFORD
BUS. & ECON. CONF. PROGRAM 2–3 (June 22–24, 2008) (U.K.).
22 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 104550 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-71502 (West 1977); Federal Regulation of Tobacco:
A Summary, TOBACCO CONT. LEGAL
CONSORTIUM, July 2009, at 5.
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public health by discouraging people from taking up smoking, encouraging people to
give up smoking, discouraging people from relapsing if they have given up smoking,
and reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco products.23
When it comes to “plain packaging,” government and policy motivations are
likewise clear; this extreme measure is justified by appealing to consumer protection
and the advancement of health.24 It is not necessarily a question of impacting excise
or taxes, because the fiscal implications remain unchanged; instead, it may be
weighted in favor of health policy and concerns.25 When a State adopts a law or
regulation that diminishes a trademark’s value, the trademark holder bears the
burden to show that the regulation has the effect of causing consumers to switch to
competing goods or services.26
This burden corresponds to one of the purposes of trademark law, allowing firms
to distinguish their products from other firms’ products.27 Unlike copyright and
patent law, which are justified in substantial part by the perceived value of securing
reasonable and limited incentives for creators and inventors,28 trademark law offers
23 See Explanatory Memorandum, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 4 (Austl.),
available
at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2011L02766/Explanatory%20Statement/Text
[hereinafter CCA Memorandum]; TPPB Memorandum, supra note 14. While there are a number of
methods that have been introduced to control tobacco advertising, this article focuses on the legal
responses to plain packaging of tobacco products.
24 See generally Oliver R. Mitchell, Unfair Competition, 10 HARV. L. REV. 275, 275 (1896).
Whilst beyond the scope of this article, legislative and policy measures can be seen to have shifted
the ownership of health concerns to the private sphere of tobacco companies. See generally Walter J.
Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10
Years Later, 137 CHEST 692, 692 (2010) (discussing the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998 in
which mass litigation was dropped on the proviso that tobacco companies agreed to pay billions of
dollars over a 25 year period towards the costs of healthcare for smoking related diseases).
25 Thus we can note several normative aspects in health policy developments in this example,
namely that there was a growing societal recognition of harm, that action against tobacco companies
was incrementally acceptable, that cigarette packets and the contents of the messages on them were
seen as important by the tobacco companies and, perhaps most significantly, that when the
arguments were shifted from the companies versus individuals to the companies versus society in
the form of the government, the legal argument was won. See Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health
Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco Control in International Investment
Law, 48 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 93, 94–95 (2012); CCA Memorandum, supra note 23; TPPB Memorandum,
supra note 14.
26 Sam Halabi, International Trademark Protection and Global Public Health:
A JustCompensation Regime for Expropriations and Regulatory Takings, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 369
(2012) (showing that trademark regulation affects consumption by consumers). See generally
Itamar Simonson, Trademark Infringement from the Buyer Perspective: Conceptual Analysis and
Measurement Implications, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 181, 181 (1994) (describing the key test
of trademark infringement as the likelihood of confusion between trademarks); David S. Bloch &
James G. McEwen, “Like Toddlers in Big Surf:” Can the Government Control the Effects of Federal
Trademark Liability?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 209, 227 (2003) (noting that in a trademark-infringement
claim, an injunction is the only remedy that will cease consumer confusion arising from the
infringement).
27 Bloch & McEwen, supra note 26, at 227.
28 U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8 cl. 8. In the United States, at least, patent and copyright rights derive
from the “Progress Clause” of the Constitution, and exist to create incentives for “promot[ing]
Progress.” Id. Trademark law, on the other hand, falls under the “Commerce Clause” of the
Constitution and is really about protecting consumers from confusion and harm (such as believing a

[13:130 2013]The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property LawThe John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

138

incentives for businesses to invest in the quality and uniqueness of their goods and to
denote quality through combinations of words, colors, signs, shapes, and other
distinguishing marks.29 Like other intellectual property rights, however, trademarks
embody an intrinsic dichotomy between private and public interests. In the case of
trademarks, the purported social goal, or “public interest,” is the reduction of
consumers’ information costs.30 These interests often go hand in hand, i.e. high
quality products build the producer’s reputation and reduce the difficulty of
consumers’ choices. But in some contexts, these goals diverge. In fact, the object of
trademark protection presents a dichotomy between property rights and other
external values such as free speech, competition, and public health.31
Trademark law protects distinguishing symbols, images, and logos because
consumers benefit from having an inexpensive way to inform themselves about the
source of goods and services.32 When manufacturers successfully associate their
products with desirable qualities and prices in the minds of consumers, they reduce
product is from one reputable source, when it’s really from someone else). See Peter C. Christensen,
The “Use in Commerce” Requirement for Trademark Registration After Larry Harmon Pictures, 6
IDEA 327, 327–28 (1992). For historical accounts of the trademark regime reaching further back in
time, see Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265,
266 (1975); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 309 (1979); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early
History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551 (1969); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning
Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29, 29 (1911). In Australia and the European Union, by comparison,
there is less emphasis on consumer confusion and more emphasis on protecting the value of brands
[in an economic sense] if they so warrant it. WIPO MAG. 2002, supra note 20, at 10 (“[T]he ultimate
success of a brand is also judged in terms of the total value derived by the customer from the
product to which it relates.”).
29 See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1912) (“The entire substantive
law of trade-marks . . . is a branch of the broader law of unfair competition. The ultimate offense
always is that defendant has passed off his goods as and for those of the complainant.”); Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (“Traditional trademark infringement law is part
of the broader law of unfair competition . . . that has its sources in English common law.”). See also
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412–13 (1916), which states,
[t]he essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or
vendor for those of another. . . . This essential element is the same in trademark
cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trademark
infringement. In fact, the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader
law of unfair competition.
30 Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1844 (2007) (“[T]he goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to improve the quality of
information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs.”). Note that some
scholars may use consumer information and consumer protection interchangeably, which is
erroneous.
31 See generally Thorsten Klein, The Uncertain Balance Between Parody and Trademark
Rights, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 356, 356–57 (2001) (analyzing U.S. courts’ view of parody in
trademark cases, including its protection under the First Amendment); César Ramirez-Montes, A
Re-Examination of the Original Foundations of Anglo-American Trademark Law, 14 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 91, 151–64 (2010) (discussing the historical conception of trademark law as a
balancing of public and private interests).
32 See I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 207, 209–11 (1995) (presenting empirical evidence in support of search cost rationale).
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consumers’ costs of deciding which types or brands of products to purchase in the
future.33 The basic motivation of trademark law is to protect an entity’s mutually
beneficial relationship with the consumer by prohibiting one economic competitor’s
encroachment on investments in product distinction made by another.34 As one
scholar said:
[An] authority would be able to rebut a trademark holder’s initial showing
by proving the regulation’s informational benefit to consumers. These
burdens correspond to both the origin of trademark as a state-granted
privilege and the state’s power to inform and protect consumers. A
trademark holder may, however, be able to show that a proposed regulation
should be prohibited because it is unjustifiably discriminatory, and the
state may be able to show that for some product categories, such as
digestible goods, it is under no obligation to pay compensation. The close
relationship between the latter form of goods and human health entitles the
state to partially or wholly prohibit the use of a trademark.
[Certain] normative implications surround the regulation of trademarks.
Some scholars and advocates argue that the state should enjoy wide
flexibility to regulate, restrict, or prohibit trademarks when their
underlying or suggested messages may mislead consumers, especially with
regard to product risks. These arguments arise from the state’s essential
role of ensuring fundamental constitutional or human rights in health,
safety, and information. In contrast, trademark holders, which invest vast
sums of money to create an independent value in the minds of consumers,
argue that their entire investment deserves protection for the benefit of
both firms and consumers.35

33 See, e.g., FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 16 (W.C. Little
1860). Foreshadowing contemporary economic justifications of trademark protection, Upton noted
that a trademark is:

the means, and in many instances, the only means, by which [manufacturers] are
enabled to inspire and retain public confidence in the quality and integrity of the
things made and sold—and thereby secure for them a permanent and reliable
demand—which is the life of manufacturing and mercantile operations. And it is
also . . . the only means, by which the public is protected against the frauds and
impositions of the crafty and designing.
Id.

34 See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, TRADEMARK LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 7 (2007), available at
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/papers/EJWP0207.pdf.
35 Halabi, supra note 26, at 333–34.
See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 783 (describing
concerns about the effect of particular rights on consumers and competitors, and on the
competitiveness of the marketplace as a whole, as the “core values of trademark law”). See also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“Our overall conclusion is that trademark law . . . can best be explained
on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”). Posner, then, might view
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This is not to say that trademark law should solely be used to protect
consumers; this was not its traditional intention.36 “Instead, trademark law, like all
unfair competition law, [seeks] to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of
their trade by competitors.”37 Revisiting trademark principles in the context of plain
packaging is important because this new regulatory technique calls into question
much of the dominant account of modern trademark law in a manner contemplated
by the framers of the TRIPS Agreement.38 “Specifically, reading traditional
trademark decisions in their proper historical and philosophical context shows that
trademark law was never focused primarily on consumer interests.”39 In recent
times in particular, the position taken by Australia—not to mention the WTO—with
respect to tobacco plain packaging laws, appears to seek an alignment between the
recognition of property rights in trademarks and traditional trademark law in order
to improve the quality of information in the marketplace.40
those results as “efficient.” One might doubt the significance of that conclusion, however, since
modern law and economics scholars tend to operate under an artificially constrained definition of
efficiency. Cf. Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 641–43 (1980)
(discussing the folly of conflating normative and positive economic accounts of the law, and
criticizing Posner, among others, for restricting the notion of efficiency in their positive analysis).
Moreover, under a broader definition, it is not clear that efficiency should be the goal of trademark
law. Any efficiency gained through reduction of search costs would relate only to a partial-efficiency.
Although, as Rizzo has argued, we cannot determine “with any reasonable degree of accuracy when
an overall efficiency improvement has occurred.” Id. at 642.
36 McKenna, supra note 30, at 1844.
37 Id. at 1841; accord Mitchell, supra note 24, at 275.
38 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) at ¶¶ 4–5 [hereinafter TRIPS Declaration]. It states:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’
right to protect public health . . . . In this connection, we reaffirm the right of
WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which
provide flexibility for this purpose . . . . In applying the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement
shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed,
in particular, in its objectives and principles.
Id.; see also WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995, ¶ 6 [hereinafter TBT
Agreement]. The agreement states that,
[under WTO rules,] no country should be prevented from taking measures . . . for
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or . . . of the
environment . . . at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement
that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are
otherwise in accordance with the provisions of [the WTO] Agreement.
Id.
39
40

McKenna, supra note 30, at 1841.
See CCA Memorandum, supra note 23.
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This article snips the normative strength of criticisms of modern trademark
law,41 which focus on the law’s deviation from its supposed foundational, and
primary, purpose of improving the quality of information in the marketplace.42 This
is particularly apparent with respect to legislation and statutory provisions discussed
in this article. It should be noted that while modern trademark law deserves
sustained scrutiny, any criticisms leveled against it should fairly convene modern
policy goals. Further, such criticisms should not draw their normative force by
contrasting modern doctrines with “traditional” principles that did not actually exist.
After introducing the genesis and rationale of plain packaging, the focus of this
article will shift to the legal status of this tobacco control tool under the international
system for trademark protection as enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris
Convention, as well as under domestic laws.
II. INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
A number of politicians and commentators seek to justify the expulsion of plain
packaging legislation based on a number of Articles in the Paris Convention and
TRIPS Agreement, including Articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, and 20.43 As will be explained,
however, these concerns should be put to rest.
In one recent report, Professor Daniel Gervais of Vanderbilt University Law
School states that regulatory measures mandating plain packaging of tobacco
products, i.e., cigarettes, could be contrary to the TRIPS Agreement.44 This report

41 See McKenna, supra note 30, at 1843 (observing that modern trademark law “sees a
trademark as a repository for value and meaning, which may be deployed across a wide range of
products and services”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 873, 900 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996), and arguing that trademark owners “are
well on their way to owning the exclusive right to pun”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 371–72 (1999) (describing the “radical and ongoing expansion of
trademark protection” as a shift from “deception-based trademark,” which focused on a trademark’s
value merely as a device for conveying otherwise indiscernible information about a product, to
“property-based trademark,” which regards a trademark as a valuable product in itself); Margaret J.
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1304–05 n.29 (1998) (“Modern trademark law is
moving . . . towards a . . . property rights regime.”). Professor Lemley says, on this basis, that
trademark law reflects “the death of common sense.” Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and
the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687 (1999).
42 McKenna, supra note 30, at 1840. This is an important premise playing down the property
rights that may be argued to vest in the trademark regime. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166–68 (2003).
43 TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 2, 6–8, 15, 17, 20.
44 DANIEL GERVAIS, JAPAN TOBACCO INT’L, ANALYSIS OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF CERTAIN
TOBACCO PRODUCT PACKAGING RULES WITH THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE PARIS CONVENTION19
(2010) [hereinafter GERVAIS REPORT]. In particular, Gervais relies on establishing other breaches:
specifically, Articles 2.1, 15.4 and 17 of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at 8–11. Gervais repeatedly
emphasizes that he is not addressing normative questions or any specific government measure,
although he does mention the Australian and certain other proposals. Id. at 5.; see also BRITISH
AMERICAN TOBACCO AUSTRALIA, SUBMISSION ON THE TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING BILL 8–9 (2011).
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concludes that “[t]o the extent that the WTO Member [such as Australia] cannot
satisfy the burden of showing that . . . plain packaging . . . will achieve its legitimate
public policy objectives, the measure can be expected to be found incompatible with
TRIPS.”45
In another report, Lalive expresses the opinion that plain packaging is “in clear
breach . . . of WTO members’ international obligation to protect valid intellectual
property rights.”46 These views are, however, not entirely accurate.
Because recent scholarship has comprehensively analyzed these reports, this
paper does not seek to dissect them into their various constituents; instead it aims to
highlight two key issues that may challenge the validity of plain packaging
legislation:



Whether the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement confers on
trademark owners a right to use their trademarks; and
What the meaning and scope is of the phrase “encumbered by special
requirements” as it appears in Article 20 of TRIPS.

This paper does not, however, discuss the “in the course of trade” language of Article
20 because tobacco sales and provision may fall outside of the course of trade.47
Advocates seeking to utilize this provision, either alone or in combination, should
reconsider that thought.
A. Trademark “Use”
As a starting point, members of the WTO and parties to the Paris Convention
are obliged, pursuant to TRIPS Article 2.1, to comply with the Paris Convention as a
matter of international law with respect to other Paris Convention parties.48 Such
parties and members are also obliged to comply with the Paris Convention provisions
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides that “[i]n respect of Parts II, III and IV of [the TRIPS Agreement], [WTO]
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris
Convention (1967).”49
TRIPS Article 2.2 continues that “[n]othing in Parts I to IV of [the TRIPS
Agreement] shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each
other under the Paris Convention” or certain other treaties.50 It should be noted that
neither the Paris Convention nor the TRIPS Agreement directly confers on

Both Gervais and Lalive argue that Article 20 is breached, which may be somewhat more arguable,
but remains an erroneous path. See LALIVE REPORT, infra note 46, at 2.
45 GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 4.
46 LALIVE, WHY PLAIN PACKAGING IS IN VIOLATION OF WTO MEMBERS’ INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS UNDER TRIPS AND THE PARIS CONVENTION 2 (2009) [hereinafter LALIVE REPORT].
47 See infra Parts III.B & III.C.
48 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 2.1.
49 Id. art. 2.1.
50 Id. art. 2.2.
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trademark owners a right to use their trademarks.51 Instead, the right may be
described as “implied,” particularly due to (1) the absence of an express right to use a
trademark in the Paris Convention; (2) the presence of strict obligations to register
some trademarks in some circumstances; and (3) the alleged futility of requiring
registration without also requiring use.52 The obligation flows from Article 6
quinquies (A), which reads:
(1) Every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be accepted
for filing and protected as is in the other countries of the Union, subject to the
reservations indicated in this Article.53
Article 6 quinquies (B) of the Paris Convention, a provision which is
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement pursuant to TRIPS Article 2.1, provides:
Trademarks covered by this Article may be neither denied registration nor
invalidated except in the following cases:
(i) when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third
parties in the country where protection is claimed;
(ii) when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist exclusively
of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind,
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or
the time of production, or have become customary in the current language
or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country
where protection is claimed;
(iii) when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of
such a nature as to deceive the public.54
Generally speaking, a tobacco trademark would not fall under the first or second
paragraphs of Article 6 quinquies (B).55 The third paragraph could be utilized to
restrict certain deceptive trademarks, including use of the words “light” or “mild” in
connection with cigarettes in a manner that is likely to deceive the consumer into
believing that those cigarettes are healthier than any others.56

LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 8 art. 16 (conferring on mark holders a right to prevent third
parties from using a registered trademark, but not a right to use the trademark). The exceptions to
the right conferred by Article 16 are irrelevant, and need not be discussed in this paper.
53 Paris Convention, supra note 9, art. 6 quinquies (A).
54 Id. art. 6 quinquies (B).
55 See id.; LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
56 See GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 20 (“This Article . . . concerns the mark, not the
product . . . so [it] could not provide a justification for restricting tobacco trademarks generally.”)
(emphasis in original).
51
52
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Nor is Article 6 quinquies (B) directed towards the use of trademarks,57 but
rather towards their registration and validity.58 This is the right saved by Article
24.5, which provides that certain measures “shall not prejudice . . . the right to use a
trademark.”59 Importantly, plain packaging does not prevent the registration of new
trademarks or require the invalidation of any registered trademarks.60 So, while
Article 6 quinquies (B) may not provide a justification for plain packaging, it does not
preclude plain packaging.61
At the same time, there is a noteworthy conflict between Article 6(1), which
provides that the conditions for filing and registration of trademarks are a matter for
the domestic legislation of each country of the Union,62 and Article 6 quinquies,
which requires acceptance for filing and protection in some circumstances.63 This
conflict between the provisions in the Paris Convention has been the subject of
formal adjudication at the WTO. Notably, “the Paris Convention regime, which is
directed exclusively at the issue of registration and not use, is [quite] liberal in terms
of the grounds upon which registration may be denied.”64 Viewed another way, the
registration requirements of the Paris Convention are relatively loose.65
57 Mark Davison, The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging Under International Intellectual Property
Law: Why There is no Right to Use a Trademark Under Either the Paris Convention or the TRIPS
Agreement, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES (Edward Elgar
2012) (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009115.
He states that:

While numerous countries have a right to use a trademark incorporated into their
domestic legislation, the difference between that right and a right implied into an
international treaty is that the former can be varied, modified, qualified and
eliminated at the legislative will of the government. For example, the Australian
legislation states that a trademark owner has the right to use their trademark,
but nobody seriously quibbles with the proposition that legislation banning the
use of tobacco advertising and, therefore, the use of tobacco trademarks in such
advertising is a permitted derogation from that right. . . . No such approach can
be taken if Australia has an international obligation under the Paris Convention
to provide a right of use.
Id. at 7. Davison also agrees with Gervais that the exception for Article 17 is inapplicable. Id. at 10.
58 Id. Invalidation refers to the cancellation of a trademark following registration. Compare
LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 5 (maintaining that plain packaging entails a violation of Article 6
quinquies (B)), with GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 22 (explaining that such a violation is likely
to arise “if plain packaging measures were to lead to a denial of registration of trademarks because
they are associated with tobacco products”).
59 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 24.5.
60 TPPA 2011, supra note 3, s 29. Indeed, the Australian legislation explicitly prevents the
Registrar of Trade Marks from refusing to register or revoking the registration of a trademark on
the grounds that plain packaging requirements prevent the mark from being used or from
distinguishing the relevant product. Id. ss 28(2)–(3).
61 Compare LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 7 (contending that both registration and
invalidation “both imply use”) (emphasis added), with GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 21
(arguing that “the spirit of the Paris Convention is to permit use”) (emphasis added).
62 Paris Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
63 Id. art. 6 quinquies.
64 Davison, supra note 57, at 6 (emphasis added).
65 See id.
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“Consequently, the oblique but constant references to either a right to use that flows
from registration or a right to use in order to obtain registration lose much of their
force because the obligation to register” may be quite limited.66 In turn, this could
mean that establishing a breach of the Convention where use is decoupled from
registration is relatively difficult to determine.67 Further, one might argue that
because “there is considerable scope under the Paris Convention to refuse
registration, there is necessarily an even greater scope to refuse usage.”68 As noted
by commentators, it is clear that the “spirit” of the Paris Convention varies between
Member Nations.69 The grounds upon which these countries may refuse registration,
let alone prevent the use of trademarks whether registered or not, vary accordingly.70
The boundaries of exceptions to the right of use are thus unclear.71 In
particular, is there merely a right to some use of the trademark in certain
circumstances? If so, would plain packaging legislation satisfy this through
authorizing the use of trademarks in a context other than retail? It is important to
note that there are no express exceptions in the Paris Convention to a right to use a
trademark, as Davison recognizes, probably because there is no need to create
exceptions to a non-existent right.72 “There are some references to exceptions to the
rights of trademark owners in Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement and to justifiable
limits on the use of trademarks in particular circumstances in Article 20[,]”73 a full
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. “In any event, Article 17 is an
exception to a right [conferred by Article 16] to prevent third parties from using one’s
trade mark, not an exception to a right to use a trademark.”74 Primarily, for that
reason, it remains irrelevant.75
While numerous countries have a right to use a trademark incorporated into
their domestic legislation, the difference between that right and a right implied into
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.; see also, e.g., TPPA 2011, supra note 3, s 28 (indicating that this Bill does not prevent
registration of any trademarks for tobacco products). Section 28 specifically provides that the
absence of an intention on the part of a trademark applicant to use the trademark because of the
legislation does not disqualify that applicant from obtaining registration. Id. This is considerably
looser than has been claimed by tobacco advocates.
68 See Davison, supra note 57, at 6. Member Nations specifically rejected a proposal to include
a right to use a trademark at the 1956 Lisbon Conference and, to this day, there is still no express
right to use in the Paris Convention. Id. at 4.
69 Id. at 6.
70 Id. (“[T]he ‘spirit’ of the Paris Convention is quite clearly to be very deferential . . . to the
right of Member Nations to prevent the use of trademarks, whether registered or not.”); see also
TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 15.4 (regarding the registration of trademarks and reproducing Article 7 of
the Paris Convention).
71 See Davison, supra note 57, at 7.
72 Id. If there was an implied right to use a trademark, in the absent of express exceptions to
this right, they too would either simply not exist or would have to be implied. Id. This would
require that defining the right to use becomes the critical factor, including the full nature and scope
of that right. Id.
73 Id. at 8.
74 Davison, supra note 57, at 8. (“However, impliedly importing provisions from the much later
TRIPS Agreement is hardly a means of interpreting the Paris Convention.”).
75 Id. at 8, 10 (“[S]ome tobacco advocates insist that plain packaging legislation does not come
within those exceptions [,which] tend[s] to obfuscate the point that it does not matter.”).
66
67
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an international treaty is that the former can be varied, modified, qualified, and
eliminated at the legislative will of the government. At the same time, the
relationship between the right to use under Article 6 quinquies and the obligation to
register a trademark in some circumstances, coupled with preventing the denial of
registration under Article 7 because of the nature of the goods, creates its own
difficulties.76 While WTO members, for example, may ban certain products, the
combination of these Articles may endorse the prohibition of banning certain
products, e.g., alcohol, fireworks, tobacco.77
If, however, the use of a trademark is prohibited, then what is the underlying
rationale or purpose to register a trademark?78 There exist at least two premises
recognized by Davison.79 First, manufacturers may still seek to preserve the
registration of a trademark to facilitate their place in an international trade
environment.80 Second, where governments are indecisive about plain packaging
legislation in the pursuit of policy objectives that prevent usage in a manner that is
“contrary to . . . national interest[s],” Article 5 of the Paris Convention, dealing with
cancellation for non-use, may be invoked by trademark registrants to preserve their
rights.81 The aforementioned position, in particular, is complemented nicely by
Article 19.1, which recognizes its focus on preventing cancellation of registration on
the basis of non-use.82 Article 19.1 indicates that (i) the TRIPS Agreement itself does
not require use to maintain registration, rather, this is left to domestic regulatory
systems, and (ii) even if a Member conditions the maintenance of registration on use,
the Member must accept government requirements as valid reasons justifying nonuse.83
The only significant argument under TRIPS with respect to plain packaging of
cigarettes concerns a rather intricate provision, Article 20. One poignant aspect of
this Article is its ability to interact with a number of other articles, including Article
8, which relates to public health considerations.84 This is particularly helpful in
76 GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 22.
This is, of course, assuming that the Paris
Convention confers an implied right to use a trademark. Also, it is unclear as to the true meaning of
the “nature”—i.e., “use” of the trademark or some form of fiscal transaction, such as a sale of a good,
to which the particular trademark attaches itself.
77 Compare GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 21 (stating that WTO Members can ban certain
products but not prohibit sale of legal products), with LALIVE REPORT, supra note 46, at 8
(explaining that plain packaging targets actual use of trademark where Article 7 targets the product
of trademark).
78 Davison, supra note 57, at 9 (“There is a legitimate question as to why there is any point in
registering trademarks if their use is prohibited.”).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 19.1.
83 Id.
84 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 8. Note that the Paris Convention is silent about public health
considerations. Notwithstanding the existence of Article 8, the application of the TRIPS Agreement
proved to be problematic with regard to public health measures before the adoption of the Doha
Declaration. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469, 480 (2002) (highlighting
that “[d]eveloping country concerns with the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on access to medicines
evolved over a period of years, and these concerns were expressed in many fora”).
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elucidating the interplay between private-rights and public-rights previously
raised.85 An argument may be made, in this respect, that such interactions support
wide discretionary powers of governments to introduce plain packing legislation, as
long as health policy and constitutional mandates are permitting.86
Viewed in isolation, however, it would appear that restrictions on the manner in
which certain trademarks, i.e., word marks,87 can appear on tobacco packaging would
fall within the meaning of Article 20, particularly the phrase “encumb[rance] by
special requirements.”88
Notably, while domestic legislation governing plain
packaging would permit word trademarks to be used, the manner, as noted by
Davison, in which they may be used could amount to the creation of an
“encumbrance,” which would constitute an implied right to use a trademark.89 The
implication of a right to use a trademark under Article 20 necessarily flows from
defining an encumbrance as including a total prohibition on use.90 If a total
prohibition on use of trademark is an encumbrance within the meaning of Article 20,
then the prohibition of the sale of goods for which trademarks currently exist comes
within its operation.91 Therefore, the prohibition on the sale of the goods would have
to be justified.92 The meaning of “encumbered by special requirements” for the
purposes of Article 20 of TRIPS does not include a partial or total prohibition on the
use of a trademark.93 This interpretation is consistent with, and required by, a view
that there is no implied right to use a trademark conferred by Article 20. It is also

85
86

See Davison, supra note 57, at 9.
See id. Davison states:
Trademark usage is but one of multiple factors that governments consider in
making policy decisions. It is difficult to accept that governments would
compromise their ability to protect public health and to pursue other valid policy
objectives via the oblique and imprecise means of conferring an implied right to
use trademarks without so much as a suggestion as to how to limit that right or
how to create exceptions to it.

Id.

87 See id. at 10–11. A trademark may also be “a non-word trademark, which includes artistic
works such as logos, figurative or stylised marks, shape marks and colour marks. The use of these
non-word trademarks is prohibited by the plain packaging legislation at the retail level, as only
word trademarks may be used on tobacco packaging.” Id. at 11.
88 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 20. Note, however, that a primary objective of Article 20 is “to
prevent governments requiring trademark owners to take positive action that would diminish the
distinctiveness of their own trademarks.” Davison, supra note 57, at 13. This is not the same as the
ability of governments to confer a right to use trademarks. Id.
89 Davison, supra note 57, at 15–16; see also GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 12.
90 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 20; see also Davison, supra note 57, at 11 (“[T]he four examples of
special requirements given by Article 20 generate an ejusdem generis in which ‘special requirements’
constituting the encumbrance are requirements relating to actual use, not partial or total
prohibition of use.”).
91 See Davison, supra note 57, at 11–12.
92 Id. at 12. (stating that the need for justification “is only strengthened by Article 7 of the
Paris Convention, which is incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by TRIPS Articles 2 and 15(4)”).
93 Davison, supra note 57, at 12.
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consistent with, and an integral part of, the matrix of trademark protection provided
by the Paris Convention and TRIPS.94
B. Peripheral Factors—Triumphant or Treacherous?
Advocates and scholars contesting trademark holders’ claims may seek to focus
on human rights, public health, and even textual reasons to justify expansive publicinterest regulations.95 In the context of tobacco control, scholars and advocates
invoke the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control96
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights97 to justify
strong laws limiting the use of tobacco trademarks.98 According to scholars, because
human rights are inviolable, a trademark holder’s property interest is necessarily
subordinate in the case of a conflict.99 In this sense, if a prohibition concerning the
use of property can be justified as reasonably necessary to the performance by a State
of its recognized obligations to protect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare,
then it would normally seem that there has been no “taking” of property.100 This
view is well in-line with the objectives of TRIPS Article 8.
Further, Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement state that there should be a
balance struck between private profit and social welfare.101 The Committee on
94

Id. at 16. Davison says:
In other words, Articles 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of TRIPS combine perfectly with
the Paris Convention to maintain the registrability of inherently distinctive
trademarks, if there is a prohibition on their use. Simultaneously, they avoid all
the difficulties necessarily involved with implying a right of use of such
trademarks, and they protect the distinctiveness of trademarks from any positive
actions by third parties or government-mandated actions of trademark owners
that might affect that distinctiveness.

Id.

GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 13–14; see also Vadi, supra note 25, at 95.
World Health Org. Framework for Convention on Tobacco Control, Feb. 27, 2005, 2302
U.N.T.S. 166 [hereinafter WHO Convention]; Working Grp. on the World Health Org. Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, Oct. 25–29, 1999, Report of the First Meeting of the Working Group,
¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/FCTC/WG1/7 (Oct. 28, 1999) [hereinafter WHO Framework Report].
97 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966,
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter ESC Int’l Covenant].
98 The importance of the WHO Convention in a State introducing plain packing legislation is
discussed below. See Allyn L. Taylor & Douglas W. Bettcher, WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control: A Global “Good” for Public Health, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 920, 925 (2000).
99 GERVAIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 17–18.
100 Id. at 18.
101 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 7. It states:
95
96

The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasized “[t]he end which intellectual
property protection should serve is the objective of human well-being, to which
international human rights instruments give legal expression.”102 This paper is
sensitive to the fact that trademarks, when seen in the light of human rights
concerns, discloses the “paradox of property”—that is, the paradox of governments
striving for equilibrium between private and public interests.103
From a private-rights perspective, this view may be subject to criticism, as there
exists little predictability when balancing investment claims with international
human rights instruments. On the one hand, expectations of a private entity, or
investor, should be tempered by knowledge that a State’s various treaty obligations,
including human rights and/or public-health provisions, will be construed in a
manner to ensure efficiency of the legal system.104 However, as already outlined, the
language of multilateral and human-rights treaties and Conventions tend to impose
few concrete obligations. For example, as illustrated in the past by the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, a tension exists within this
agreement between the protection of intellectual property rights and the public
interest.105 Depending on the interplay between, and the interpretation of, Articles
in the TRIPS and the Paris Convention, and assuming that the drafting of provisions
in plain packaging legislation is not in breach of international obligations, the
validity of plain packaging legislation can be endorsed.
The divergence in the approaches of courts and legislatures in Australia and
United States in their attempts to balance these objectives, however, is apparent in
part IV of this paper. As will be discussed, the key lies in courts’ recognition of the
“instrumental” nature or character of intellectual property rights and statutory
purpose, which begs the question of whether, in protecting property rights, a balance
between private-right and public-right can be struck.
It is argued that the character, broadly speaking, of such rights, and of the
conditions informing their creation, may be relevant to identifying whether and in
what circumstances restriction or regulation of their enjoyment by a statute amounts
to acquisition, in the case of Australia, or taking of property, in the United States
pursuant to their Constitutions.
For now, at least, the relative unpredictability of arbitration and judicial
decisions on the appropriate extent of regulation without compensation, in the

Id. (emphasis added).
102 Vadi, supra note 25, at 122; see also United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001)
[hereinafter ECOSOC].
103 Vadi, supra note 25, at 122; see also Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights,
3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 349, 360–61 (1999).
104 ECOSOC, supra note 102, ¶ 4.
105 TRIPS Declaration, supra note 38, ¶ 4 (expressing that the Doha Declaration affirms that
“the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health.”). In this regard, the Doha Declaration enshrines the principles the WHO has
publicly advocated and advanced over the years, namely the re-affirmation of the right of WTO
Members to make full use of the safeguard provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in order to protect
public health and enhance access to medicines for poor countries.
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context of plain packaging, suggests that scholars, judges, and regulators need to
consider the appropriate way to compensate trademark holders. Informative debates
fail to give adequate guidance.
III. DOMESTIC SPHERE
As outlined, there are a number of arguments challenging the validity of plain
packaging legislation at an international level. However, the extent to which these
arguments may succeed remains unseen. The international framework is a complex
web of Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, which allow some discretion for
States to interpret international principles and implement them in domestic law.
This section draws a comparison between the relevant Constitutional provisions in
Australia and the United States that may be invoked to support or deny plain
packaging legislation. As discussed previously, the normative focus remains on a
property-rights perspective.
Presently, Australia is the only jurisdiction that has passed and implemented
plain packaging legislation.106 The discussion in this section, therefore, will be
focused primarily on legal and Constitutional challenges of comparative jurisdictions
that have considered, or are considering, substantially similar legislative provisions.
A. Social “Harms” and Policy “Norms”
In 2012, Australia became the first nation to successfully introduce statutory
mandates governing plain packaging of cigarettes.107 As already described, this
means that all tobacco products are sold in “plain olive packets” that contain no
promotional or branding messages from the producer.108 While at first glance one
might see this as a radical step, such action is entirely consistent with long-standing
international initiatives and protocols.
In 2005, for example, the World Health Organization adopted a framework
convention on the distribution or sale of tobacco products.109 This protocol, which
was ultimately signed by 168 nations, was the first treaty negotiated by the
international organization to attract support to reaffirm the universal human right
accessing the highest standards of health.110 Its adoption is described as a “paradigm
shift in developing a regulatory strategy to address addictive substances.”111 One
important aspect that separates it from, for example, drug control treaties, is that it
See TPPA 2011, supra note 3, at s 2–3.
TPPA 2011, supra note 3.
108 Id. s 19(2)(ii).
109 WHO Convention, supra note 96; see also C. Callard et al., Transforming the Tobacco
Market: Why the Supply of Cigarettes Should be Transferred from For-Profit Corporations to NonProfit Enterprises With a Public Health Mandate, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 278, 278 (2005).
110 Ruth Roemer et al., Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 95 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 936, 936 (2005).
111 Christopher Man-Kit Leung et. al., Fighting Tobacco Smoking—A Difficult but Not
Impossible Battle, 6 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 69, 73 (2009).
106
107
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addresses demand as well as supply reduction.112 Importantly, the framework
document and subsequent protocols were a response to an increasingly perceived
need to combat the “globalization of the tobacco epidemic.”113 This “epidemic” is
enabled through business strategies that have effects across borders, including trade
liberalization.114 In other words, tobacco companies have been able to take
advantage of economic forces that are designed to enhance and assist in development
and economic growth.115 Accordingly, the WHO produced a number of “core demand”
provisions, which are within two broad categories: price and tax measures, not
addressed in this paper; and non-price measures to promote reduction.116 These nonprice measures include: protection from tobacco smoke; regulation of the contents of
tobacco products; regulation of tobacco product disclosures; packaging and labeling of
tobacco products; education, communication, and training, as well as enhanced public
awareness, advertising, promotion, and sponsorship; and demand reduction
measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation.117
As noted, the treaty has 168 signatories, including the European Union, and
therefore it is one of the most “widely embraced” treaties in the history of the United
Nations.118 Though signatories’ obligations are subject to their interpretations and
wills to take action, the obligation is clear.119 Furthermore, if we take the above
noted provisions as a whole, they clearly justify any action that may result in a
reduction in health problems. This is because a signatory places itself under an
obligation to take action regarding packaging and labeling in order to meet the
requirements of international obligations, as well as to promote public awareness of
the dangers of tobacco. Thus, when tobacco companies, such as British American
Tobacco Australasia Limited (“BAT”) and JT International SA (“JTI”), challenged the
Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011, the WHO Convention only strengthened the
position of the government.
Despite arguments to the contrary,120 it is fair to say that governments that are
active in regulating tobacco distribution—including, but not limited to, Australia, the
United States, Canada, and the European Union—have greater responsibilities to
their citizens than merely upholding the rights of particular groups. For example,
there is an understanding of a duty to ensure that citizens are not harmed, i.e.,
misled, which has a place in complementary legislation, including legislation
governing consumer protection.121
Id.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2011: WARNING
ABOUT THE DANGERS OF TOBACCO 12, available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/en/
[hereinafter 2011 WHO REPORT].
114 Id.; Leung et. al., supra note 111, at 71.
115 Leung et. al., supra note 111, at 71.
116 2011 WHO REPORT, supra note 113, at 12–13.
117 Id.
118 Leung et. al., supra note 111, at 73.
119 It should be noted that the United States, whilst having signed the Convention, has not
ratified it.
Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO,
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/index.html (last updated June 25, 2013).
120 See Callard et. al., supra note 109, at 278.
121 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (Austl.) (formerly the Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) s 51ADG governing “false or misleading information”); The Federal Trade
112
113
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B. The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth)
The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (“TPPA”) imposes significant
restrictions upon the color, shape, and finish of retail packaging for tobacco products.
It is an object of the TPPA to give effect to the obligations that Australia has as a
party to the WTO Convention.122 The Act thereby relies upon the power of the
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to external affairs.123
The TPPA is superimposed upon pre-existing regulatory requirements for health
warnings, safety, and information standards applied to tobacco products and their
packaging.124 Its stated objectives include the improvement of public health by
“discouraging people from taking up smoking,” “encouraging people to give up
smoking,” “discouraging people who have given up smoking . . . from relapsing,” and
“reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco products.”125 It prohibits the use of
trademarks on such packaging, other than those permitted by the TPPA, which
allows the use of a “brand, business or company name for the tobacco product[].”126
Importantly, Part 3 of Chapter 1 of the TPPA, entitled “Constitutional provisions,”
provides for the Act’s additional operation in reliance upon corporations’ power, the
trade and commerce power, and the Territories’ power.127
Section 15(1) provides for the non-application of the TPPA to the extent, if any,
“that its operation would result in an acquisition of property from a person otherwise
than on just terms.”128 Section 15(2) provides that if, leaving aside section 15, the
TPPA “would result in such an acquisition of property because it would prevent the
use of a trade mark or other sign on or in relation to the retail packaging of tobacco
products . . . the trade mark or sign may be used.”129 It was the validity of that
subsection, amongst others, that was at issue.
Substantive requirements for the physical features, colors, and finishes of retail
packaging are imposed by sections 18 and 19 of the TPPA and by the Tobacco Plain
Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) (“the TPP Regulations”) made under that Act.130
Embellishments on cigarette packs and cartons are proscribed.131 Packs and cartons
are to be rectangular, have only a matte finish, and bear on their surfaces the color
prescribed by the TPP Regulations.132 Absent regulation, the color of the package
must be a drab dark brown.133 The TPP Regulations says that “brand, business or
Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOOLS FOR ADVANCING TOBACCO CONTROL IN THE 21ST CENTURY, TOBACCO
CONTROL LEGISLATION: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 268 (2004).
122 TPPA 2011, supra note 3, ss 3, 18–19.
123 Id. s 8.
124 Id. s 3.
125 Id.
126 Id. s 20.
127 Id. s 14; see also Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15A (Austl.) (requiring that
construction of Federal legislative instruments be subject to the Constitution).
128 TPPA 2011, supra note 3, s 15(1).
129 Id. s 15(2) (emphasis added).
130 Id. ss 18–19.
131 Id.
132 Id. ss 18(2)(b), 19(2).
133 Id. s 19(2)(b).
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company name, or any variant name, for tobacco products that appears on the retail
packaging . . . must comply with” the TPP Regulations.134 They must not obscure any
“relevant legislative requirement” or “appear more than once on any of the . . . front,
top and bottom outer surfaces of the pack.”135
The use of trademarks on retail packaging of tobacco products is prohibited
other than as permitted by section 20(3), which provides:
The following may appear on the retail packaging of tobacco products:
(a) the brand, business or company name for the tobacco products, and any
variant name for the tobacco products;
(b) the relevant legislative requirements;
(c)

any other trade mark or mark permitted by the regulations.136

Section 26 imposes a similar conditional prohibition on the use of trademarks on
tobacco products.137 The term “relevant legislative requirement[]” in section 20(3)(b)
includes a health warning required by the Trade Practices (Consumer Product
Information Standards) (Tobacco) Regulations 2004 (Cth) (“the TPCPI Regulations”),
or a safety or information standard made or declared under the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (“the CCA”).138 Chapter 3 of the TPPA creates offences and
provides for civil penalties.139
The relevant prescriptive provisions of TPPA sections 18 to 27 are declared by
section 27A to have “[n]o legal effect other than to specify requirements, and provide
for regulations specifying requirements, for the purposes of the definition of tobacco
product requirement.”140
Notably, “tobacco product requirement” is a defined term that means a
requirement specified in Part 2 of Chapter 2 or in the TPP Regulations made under
that Part.141 The registrability of trademarks and designs, whose use is subject to
constraints imposed by the TPPA and the TPP Regulations, is not to be prejudiced by
those constraints.142 Consistent with the requirements under the TRIPS Agreement
and Paris Convention already discussed, neither the TPPA nor the TPP Regulations
deprive a trademark of registrability for non-use or for “the use of the trade mark in
relation to tobacco products . . . [to] be contrary to law.”143 In this respect, neither the
TPPA, nor the circumstance that a person cannot “us[e] a trade mark on or in
relation to the retail packaging of tobacco products, or on tobacco products,” is a
Id. s 21.
Id.
136 Id. s. 20.
137 Id. s 26.
138 Id. s 20(3).
139 Id. ch 3.
140 Id. s 27(a) (emphasis in original).
141 Id. s 4.
142 Id. ss 28–29.
143 Id. s 28.
134
135
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circumstance “mak[ing] it reasonable or appropriate” to refuse or revoke registration
of the trademark, to revoke acceptance of an application for registration, or “to
register the trade mark subject to conditions or limitations.”144 There does, however,
exist a less intricate provision in section 29 of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth), a
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.145
C. The Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Case—Withstanding Constitutional
Mandates in Australia and the United States
In two proceedings heard before the High Court of Australia in April of last year,
plaintiff tobacco companies JT International SA (“JTI”) and members of the British
America Tobacco Group (“BAT”) argued that, “subject to a reading down provision,
the TPP Act effected an acquisition of their intellectual property rights and goodwill
on other than just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.”146
A majority of the Court found that the legislation was constitutionally valid
because an acquisition of statutory intellectual property on “unjust terms,” within
the meaning of section 51(xxxi), must “involve the accrual of a benefit of a
proprietary character.”147 On August 15, 2012, the High Court “made orders
reflecting the rejection of the plaintiffs’ contentions, by majority, on the basis that
there had been no acquisition of the plaintiffs’ property within the meaning of
s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.”148 The property, which was said to be the subject of
acquisition under the TPPA, comprised a mixture of statutory and associated, or
derivative, non-statutory rights, which are outlined below.
The Court said: “Section 51(xxxi) confers upon the Commonwealth Parliament
the power to make laws with respect to: ‘[t]he acquisition of property on just terms
from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has
144
145

Id.
Designs Act 2003 (Cth) s 29 (Austl.). The provision reads as follows:
Disputes between applicants
(1) This section applies if a dispute arises between 2 or more persons in
relation to whether, or in what manner, a design application should proceed.
(2) The Registrar may, on a request made in accordance with the regulations
by any of the persons, make any determinations the Registrar thinks fit for either
or both of the following purposes:
(a) enabling the application to specify which of those persons is an entitled
person in relation to a design disclosed in the application;
(b) regulating the manner in which the application is to proceed.
(3) A person mentioned in subsection (1) or (2) must be:
(a) the applicant; or
(b) a person who asserts that the person is an entitled person in relation to
a design disclosed in the application.

Id.

JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 2 (Austl.).
Id. ¶ 44.
148 Id. ¶ 3.
146
147
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power to make laws.’”149 In its analysis of whether there had been an acquisition of
all or any of the plaintiffs’ asserted property rights, the Court turned its attention to
the source and nature of the property rights and the consequences of the restrictions
imposed by the TPPA upon their use or enjoyment.150
Traditionally, the term “property” as used in section 51(xxxi), has been
construed broadly in Australia.151 The High Court acknowledged that the broad
construction of “property” and “acquisition” discussed were constructed in light of
comments by Judge Dixon in Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth.152 The
Court emphasized that “[s]ection 51(xxxi) was said to extend to ‘innominate and
anomalous interests’ and to include ‘the assumption and indefinite continuance of
exclusive possession and control for the purpose of the Commonwealth of any subject
of property.’”153
It encompassed property rights created by statute, although it is accepted that
the terms of such statutes and the nature of the property rights created require
examination to determine whether and to what extent that property attracts the
protection of section 51(xxxi).154 The rights given by successive Commonwealth
statutes to holders of registered trademarks have always been property of, what the
statute calls, the registered proprietor. Such rights, it has been noted, are “the
exclusive rights: (a) to use the trade mark; and (b) to authori[ze] other persons to use
the trade mark; in relation to the goods and/or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered.”155
In the context of trademarks, the “exclusive right” to use a mark under section
20(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 2005 (Cth) may be described as a negative right—
149
150

Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶¶ 35, 43-44.
Registered trade marks, designs, patents and copyright in works and other
subject matter give rise to, or constitute, exclusive rights which are property to
which s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution can apply. They are all rights which are
created by statute in order to serve public purposes. They differ in their histories,
their character and the statutory schemes which make provision for them.

Id. at ¶ 35.
151 See Clunies-Ross v Commonwealth (1984) 155 CLR 193, ¶ 7 (Austl.) (distinguishing the
more narrow definition of “land” in the Lands Acquisition Act 1955 (Cth)); Tape Mfrs. Ass’n Ltd v
Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480, ¶ 31 (Austl.); Minister for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR
261, 276 (Austl.); Commonwealth v New South Wales (1923) 33 CLR 1, 3 (Austl.).
152 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 41 (Austl.); Bank of NSW v
Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 12 (Austl.).
153 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 41 (Austl.).
154 It is incorrect to assert that “property” has no existence apart from statute. See AttorneyGeneral (NT) v Chaffey (2007) 231 CLR 651, 664 ¶ 23 (Austl.); Commonwealth v WMC Res. Ltd
(1998) 194 CLR 1, 70 ¶ 15 (Austl.). This should not imply, however, that the extinguishment or
restriction of a statutory exclusive right, without more, would constitute an acquisition for the
purpose of section 51(xxxi). Also, it should be borne in mind, that the property in a statutory
trademark is not permanent. JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 31 (Austl.). This
is a position consistent within the meaning of Articles 6, 7, 8 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, and
the very premise of the trademark regime. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 6–8, 20.
155 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 20 (Austl.) (emphasis added); see also Trade Marks Act 1905
(Cth) ss 49(3), 58–60 (Austl.).
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that is, a right that excludes others from using that mark.156 Notably, “trademarks
do not offer their owners positive rights to actually use the sign, but just a jus
excludendi alios, that is, a negative right to prevent third parties from using the
asset in question.”157 Regarding plain packaging, there may be some merit to the
argument that this form of packaging does not encroach on trademarks, “as no
positive right to use trade marks is offered by TRIPS to trade mark holders.”158
Notwithstanding this statement, the High Court cautioned against approaching
issues arising under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution on the premise that
registration under the Trade Marks Act 2005 (Cth), for example, conferred “some
unconstrained right to exploit those items of intellectual property or an immunity
from the operation of regulatory laws.”159
This point is important in discussing the interpretation of trademark “use” and
distinguishing “acquisition” from “taking.” In other words, considering the interplay
between negative and positive rights as to the identification, nature, and scope of
property rights is an essential first step in determining whether there has been an
acquisition, deprivation, or “taking” in breach of constitutional mandates.
With respect to the “nature” of property rights, the High Court alluded to an
important distinction between Australia and other countries, including the United
States.160 There is no doubt that intellectual property laws create property rights,
but the scope of these rights may be dependent upon whether the rights are
recognized as being “instrumental” in character, a recognition which differs from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.161 An understanding of the scope of this “instrumental in
character” language is, therefore, central to understanding the relevance of
constitutional mandates for the purposes of determining the constitutional validity of
plain packaging legislation.162
That is not to say that from the perspective of Australia, such rights are
inherently susceptible to variation on account of their instrumental character, nor
156 Vadi, supra note 25, at 122.
On the other hand, a positive right may be to obtain
registration on the satisfaction of certain conditions and may be descried as ancillary to the negative
right.
157 Id. (emphasis added). TRIPS, supra note 8 art. 16(1) states:

The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all
third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result
in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical
goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The rights
described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect
the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use.
Id.

158 Vadi, supra note 25, at 122; see also Benn McGrady, TRIPS and Trademarks: The Case of
Tobacco, 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 53, 66–67 (2004).
159 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 88 (Austl.).
160 Id. ¶¶ 112–117.
161 Id. ¶¶ 112, 126; see also PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 213–
23 (1996) (arguing in favor of instrumentalism).
162 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 42–44 (Austl.).
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that they fail to fall within the ambit of section 51(xxxi).163 Rather, there are, and
always have been, “purposive elements” reflecting public policy considerations that
influence the statutory creation of intellectual property rights.164 It is therefore
accepted that “the protection given to property rights varies with the nature of the
right.”165
An understanding of the “nature” of a property right in the context of section
51(xxxi) may be derived from its “source.” This source provides a greater contextual
understanding of the role of “purposive elements” in defining the character of the
particular right, and the protection to be afforded under the Constitution—a point
that was not intricately analyzed in the present case.166 This is unlike the position in
the United States, where such purposive elements in determining the scope of
property are subordinate to the relative requirements of, for example, the First and
Fifth Amendments.167
It is acknowledged that the “source” of section 51(xxxi) is found in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,168 which qualifies the power of the
United States to expropriate property by requiring that it should be done “on
payment of fair compensation.”169 But Australia and the United States differ in their
recognition of the nature, or “character,” of such interests.170 This, in turn, has the
effect of influencing the application of certain Constitutional mandates, discussed
below.
In relation to statutory purpose, the High Court noted that:
[R]eflected in the character of such rights and in the conditions informing
their creation, may be relevant to the question whether and in what
circumstances restriction or regulation of their enjoyment by a law of the
Commonwealth amounts to acquisition of property for the purposes of
s 51(xxxi).171
An “important distinction[]” exists regarding a taking of property and its
acquisition.172 “Taking” involves a deprivation of property seen from the perspective
of its owner, whereas “acquisition” involves receipt of something seen from the
Id.
For example, the public policy dimensions of trade mark legislation and the contending
interests which such dimensions accommodate were referred to in Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v
Nike Int’l Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45, 65–68 (Austl.). The observation in that case that Australian
trademarks law has “manifested from time to time a varying accommodation of commercial and the
consuming public’s interests” has application with varying degrees of intensity to other intellectual
property rights created by statute. Id.
165 Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 218 CLR 530, 577 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
166 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 29 (Austl.).
167 Id. ¶ 117.
168 Id. ¶ 111.
169 Id. (citing Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255, 282 (Austl.)); see also Grace Bros. Prop.
Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 72 CLR 269, 290 (Austl.) (noting that the phrase “on just terms” was “of
course, reminiscent of the Fifth Amendment”).
170 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 112 (Austl.).
171 Id. ¶ 30.
172 Id. ¶ 112.
163
164
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perspective of the acquirer,173 which is not composed of a mere extinguishment of
rights. The High Court has alluded to this distinction, observing that:
The emphasis in s 51(xxxi) is not on a “taking” of private property but on
the acquisition of property for purposes of the Commonwealth. To bring the
constitutional provision into play it is not enough that legislation adversely
affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to
his property; there must be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or
another acquires an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it
may be.174
In other words, section 51(xxxi) speaks of “acquisition” for any “purpose” where
there is federal legislative power.175 The Fifth Amendment, on the other hand,
“which also applies to the States by the medium of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee against the deprivation of property without due process of law,176 is
expressed in the form of a negative, appears with the due process clause, and speaks
of private property being ‘taken’ for ‘public use.’”177 “Public use” has been interpreted
to include use that is for “the public good,” “the public necessity,” or “the public
utility.”178
Yet, decisions in the United States accept that the “takings” clause may be
utilized in lieu of an “acquisition,” as referred to in Australia. This is a demanding
premise, which tobacco advocates may have to use to challenge plain packing
legislation in the United States.179 On the other hand, advocates may seek to exploit
the implicit “fairness and justice” standard in the Fifth Amendment, further
examined below, which directs that private property should not be “taken” in the
absence of just compensation.180 Reference to “fairness and justice,” in this sense,
“require[s] that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the

Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecomms. Corp. (1994) 179 CLR 297, 304–05.
JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 118 (Austl.) (emphasis in original).
175 See Trade Practices Comm’n v Tooth & Co. Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 408 (Austl.) (stating
that “not every compulsory divesting of property is an acquisition within s. 51(xxxi.)”).
176 Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (holding, prior to the
introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Fifth Amendment was a constraint solely upon
the Government of the United States).
177 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 113 (Austl.).
The public use
requirement assumes an inherent or implied legislative power to take private property for public
use.
178 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–89 (2005) (ruling that the federal
judiciary should not make an independent judgment as to whether a taking of private property is for
a “public use,” and stating that the question is whether the government authority—Federal, State or
local—can make a rational argument that the taking resulted in a “public benefit”).
179 See Trade Practices Comm’n v Tooth & Co. Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 413–15 (Austl.)
(discussing how a doctrine permitting “regulation”, which does not amount to a “taking,” moderates
the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment;); JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 115
(Austl.) (citing Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)) (“[R]egulation” amounting to a
“taking” if the regulatory actions in question are “functionally equivalent to the classic taking in
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”).
180 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons.”181
In the United States, Congress might effectively “take” a trademark “by
partially or totally prohibiting its use or by requiring additional product information
(including warnings)” in order to serve a public purpose.182 As Professor Samuel
Foster Halabi points out, this would limit the trademark holder to compensation for
“the narrow interest in distinguishing its product from others.”183
In the event the United States seeks to introduce plain packaging legislation,
and on the assumption that a “taking of property” for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment could be established, there may exist sufficient scope to argue that the
“purposive elements” of “justice and fairness” may not ever truly justify economic
injuries.184 A similar line of reasoning was expounded by Judge Brennan in the
Tasmanian Dam’s case:
[In Australia, if] this Court were to construe s. 51(xxxi) so that its
limitation applies to laws which regulate or restrict use and
enjoyment of proprietary rights but which do not provide for the
acquisition of such rights, it would be necessary to identify a
touchstone for applying the limitation to some regulatory laws and
not to others.185
According to the statement of Chief Judge Mason in that case:
To bring the Constitutional provision into play it is not enough that
legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an
owner enjoys in relation to his property; there must be an acquisition
whereby the Commonwealth or another acquires an interest in
property, however slight or insubstantial it may be.186
Applying this standard to the TPPA, it is clear that the Act does not cause the
Commonwealth or anyone else to acquire any benefit of a proprietary character in
tobacco companies’ property rights. The High Court adopted this reasoning in JT
International, noting that “the negative character of the plaintiffs’ property rights

181 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Commonwealth
v Tasmania (1983) HCA 21, ¶ 92 (Austl.).
182 Halabi, supra note 26, at 356–57.
183 Id. at 357. For an in-depth analysis of the condemnation process, see id.
184 An intricate examination of the balance between “justice and fairness” and economic rights
is reserved for a future paper by the author. See Joseph W. Singer, The Ownership Society and
Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 329
(2006) (arguing that “[p]art of what it means to be a member of society, to be an owner among
owners, is to be part of a real or imagined social contract that limits liberty to enlarge liberty, that
limits property to secure property”).
185 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) HCA 21, ¶ 92 per Brennan, J (Austl.).
186 Id. ¶ 68 per Mason, J.
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leaves something of a logical gap between the restrictions on their enjoyment and the
accrual of any benefit to the Commonwealth or any other person.”187
Further, the Court stated:
The fact that the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the TPP
Act create the “space” for the application of Commonwealth
regulatory requirements as to the textual and graphical content of
tobacco product packages does not constitute such an accrual.
Rather, it reflects a serious judgment that the public purposes to be
advanced and the public benefits to be derived from the regulatory
scheme outweigh those public purposes and public benefits which
underpin the statutory intellectual property rights and the common
law rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs. The scheme does that without
effecting an acquisition.188
This understanding of the general law has influenced the interpretation of
section 51(xxxi).189 Also important is the High Court’s recognition that, at common
law, “the property interest associated with a trade mark [i]s derived from the
goodwill of the business which used it.”190
In his discussion about goodwill coming within the bounds of “proprietary
rights,” Judge Gummow expressed caution in defining property too widely, saying
that:
[S] 51(xxxi) gives protection against acquisition of property without
just terms but “not to the general commercial and economic position
occupied by traders” and that to treat this commercial and economic
position as if it had a distinct proprietary character would be to
repeat what in Truax v Corrigan Holmes J identified in a similar
context as the fallacy of “delusive exactness.”191
“Delusive exactness,” Judge Holmes commented, “is a source of fallacy
throughout the law.”192 He observed in this regard that:
[B]y calling a business “property” you make it seem like land, and
lead up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down
the advantages of ownership existing before the statute was passed.

JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 43 (Austl.).
Id. ¶ 43.
189 Id. ¶ 110.
190 Id. ¶ 31 (citing AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) 32 RPC 273, 284 per Lord
Parker (Austl.)). For a description of the property rights attaching to “goodwill,” see Federal Comm’r
of Taxation v Murray (1998) 193 CLR 605 (Austl.); Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co. Ltd v
Joseph Nathan & Co. Ltd (1919) 26 CLR 410, 438 (Austl.).
191 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) [2012] HCA 43, ¶ 47 (Austl.).
192 Id. ¶ 47.
187
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An established business no doubt may have pecuniary value . . . [b]ut
you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing.193
At first glance, this may seem to be a conservative position. But, there is great
merit attached to this observation as, from a normative perspective, Judge Holmes
rightly endorses preventing the blur of the boundaries of economic interests at the
expense of diluting property interests.194 This passage also provides context for the
distinction the Court made between constitutional mandates in Australia and the
United States, which were already discussed.
There is great importance in understanding the distinction between an
“acquisition” of a non-right and a “taking” of property in the context of its correlation
with establishing an “encumbrance” for the purpose of TRIPS Article 20.195 Even
then, only “the use of a trademark for the purposes of Article 20” is relevant for the
purposes of assessing the legality of an “encumbrance by special requirements.”196
Yet, there are many grounds on which to argue that plain packaging legislation
exists outside of the course of trade. As Professor Davison points out, the majority of
the value of plain packaging regulation likely comes from conduct outside the pointof-sale context—for example, smokers’ social interactions.197 Further, the benefits,
i.e., improvements in public health, sought by such regulation likewise occur outside
the course of trade.198 And to the extent that plain packaging regulation may be
classified as “outside the course of trade” for the purpose of an Article 20 analysis,
WTO Members would have a broad license to enact those regulations.199 The High
Court’s decision not to characterize the TPPA as a “law of ‘trade regulation,’” placing
it outside the application of section 51(xxxi), albeit in the context of acquisition of
property, implicitly supports this view.200 Additionally, as Professors Voon and
Mitchell argue, an interpretation of Article 20 that takes account of the policy role of
public health objectives delineated in Articles 7 and 8 justifies a public healthdirected regulation like plain packaging.201

Id.
Courts mention more frequently than commentators the additional goal of protecting
producers’ goodwill, though they too generally describe that goal in market efficiency terms. See
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (stating that trademark law
“‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ [and] . . . helps assure
a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product”); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2012); Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex.
v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The idea is that
trademarks are ‘distinguishing’ features which lower consumer search costs and encourage higher
quality production by discouraging free-riders.”).
195 See Davison, supra note 57, at 11.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 21.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 116 (Austl.).
201 Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packaging of Tobacco
Products, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 14 (Edward Elgar ed.,
2012).
193
194
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D. Normative Analysis and Constitutional Mandates in the United States—A Nail in
the Coffin for Plain Packaging Legislation?
In the United States, restrictions on tobacco advertising and labeling would
likely be invalidated on grounds that they violate the First Amendment’s command
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”202 Though,
such invalidation would not come without fisticuffs. The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment’s speech protections extend to
commercial speech,203 including tobacco advertising, which could extend to plain
packaging, i.e., a “taking” or “encumbrance.”
The Supreme Court construes the First Amendment to extend protections to
some commercial speech,204 while permitting government regulation of commercial
speech in proportion to the interests advanced. An understanding of the scope of the
“interests” of the public to be recognized is, no doubt, a determining factor. A few
things should be said, in this regard.
First, courts in the United States have generally become more antagonistic to
commercial speech restrictions over time.205 And some speech simply remains
unprotected under the First Amendment.206 For example, some seemingly core
speech-rights reap no protection under the First Amendment, including obscene
speech,207 defamation,208 and inciting words.209 However, the First Amendment does
protect the related sexually oriented depictions, false and erroneous political and
religious statements, and “misguided, or even hurtful” speech.210 In a commercial
context, false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech is not protected by the
First Amendment.211 But like other commercial speech, “potentially misleading

202 U.S. CONST amend. I. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, extended that proscription to the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
203 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762–63,
770, 772–73 (1976).
204 Thompson v. Western States Med Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (holding unanimously that
“purely commercial advertising” enjoyed no First Amendment protection, and emphasizing that
“regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort”); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653,
2666–67 (2011) (subjecting a regulatory program that affected commercial speech to First
Amendment scrutiny and importing content and speaker-based concerns into the commercial speech
context).
205 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756–57 (reversing its longstanding decision in
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942)).
206 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (discussing particular words under
certain circumstances, such as fighting words, are simply unprotected).
207 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (discussing “the inherent dangers of
undertaking to regulate any form of expression,” such as obscenity).
208 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964) (establishing the “actual
malice” standard considered for defamation cases against public officials or figures).
209 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (establishing the imminent lawless
action test considered for inflammatory speech).
210 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
574 (1995).
211 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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commercial speech is protected to an intermediate degree.”212 If the concept of
“commercial speech” is broad enough to encompass certain trademarks, and such
trademarks, word or non-word, have the effect of misleading a consumer in the form
of confusion (i) as to source or (ii) as to function because of the presence or absence of
advertising the health benefits of tobacco, then plain packaging legislation would be
unlikely to fall within the ambit of First Amendment protection.213
Second, the government’s protection of commercial speech requires it to permit
factual disclosures for the benefit of the consuming public.214 It is well settled that
the government has an interest in insuring that commercial transactions are
conducted transparently and that consumers have broad access to truthful
information when making purchasing decisions.215
Accordingly, under Supreme Court precedent, the constitutionality of
commercial disclosure requirements turns on whether they “directly advance[] the
governmental interest asserted . . . [and are] not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”216 The Court has held on two occasions that the government’s
interest in preventing consumer deception is capable of supporting disclosure
requirements under this standard.217
Third, just like trademark law, the principal purpose of such disclosures is to
decrease consumers’ information costs.218 Plain packaging falls squarely within the
scope of an information-providing function. In light of this judicial approval, the
federal government has put in place myriad regulatory disclosure requirements in
order to improve access to truthful information and to protect consumers from
economic and physical harm.219 Plain packaging, through a suppression of certain
212 Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court’s
Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 399 (2012) (emphasis
in original).
213 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[A]ny
description of commercial speech that is intended to identify the category of speech entitled to less
First Amendment protection should relate to the reasons for permitting broader regulation: namely,
commercial speech’s potential to mislead.”).
214 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486.
215 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919) (“[I]t is too plain for argument that a
manufacturer or vendor has no constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair
information of what it is that is being sold.”).
216 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
217 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339–40 (2010).
218 See Pomeranz, supra note 212, at 404–05 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (“[T]he
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value
to consumers of the information such speech provides, [so commercial actors’] constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
minimal.”) (emphasis omitted).
219 Rubin, 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994),
which requires a registration statement before selling securities) (“In the commercial
context . . . government . . . often requires affirmative disclosures that the speaker might not make
voluntarily.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (mandating on cigarette packs a “Surgeon General’s Warning”
label); see also Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 116 (“Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require
the disclosure of product and other commercial information. . . To hold that the Vermont statute,
[requiring disclosures for mercury-containing products] is insufficiently related to the state’s
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items that are extraneous to the product to which it relates, does inform consumers
about the underlying product and is, therefore, consistent with existing disclosure
requirements.
Recent cases, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States220 and Discount
Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States221 (on appeal), shed further light on whether
the advertising and labeling restrictions of plain packaging legislation would amount
to permissible or impermissible restraints on a tobacco company’s commercial speech.
These cases examined whether the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act222 (“FSPTCA”) ran afoul of the commercial speech mandate in the First
Amendment.223 In order to determine whether a particular government regulation of
commercial speech is constitutionally permissible, courts use a four-step analysis
derived from Central Hudson.224
Notably, the public health goals for the FSPTCA are outlined at the beginning of
the legislation.225 Among the findings of Congress is the following statement:
[The FSPTCA regulations] will . . . advance the Federal Government’s
substantial interest in reducing the number of children and
adolescents who use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and in
preventing the life-threatening health consequences associated with
tobacco use.226
It also states that the FSPTCA regulations are:

interest in reducing mercury pollution would . . . [be] neither wise nor constitutionally required”); 15
U.S.C. § 78x (2012) (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(1) (2012) (nutritional labeling); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2012) (reporting of pollutant
concentrations in discharges to water); 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2012) (reporting of releases of toxic
substances); 21 C.F.R. s 202.1 (2008) (disclosing in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R.
s 1910.1200 (2012) (posting notification of workplace hazards).
220 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525–26, 534–35, 541
(W.D. Ky. 2010).
221 Disc. Tobacco & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2012).
222 FSPTCA, supra note 13.
223 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 522–23.
224 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(reaffirming both that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection and that the
Constitution grants a lesser degree of protection to commercial speech than to other forms of
expression). The threshold question of the Central Hudson test is whether the expression falls
within that protected by the First Amendment. Id. Only commercial speech that concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading enjoys First Amendment protection; speech related to illegal activity
or “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” does not. Id. at 563. If commercial speech
enjoys First Amendment protection, only a substantial government interest will justify a restriction,
so the second part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the government interest asserted is
“substantial.” Id. at 566. If the first two questions are answered affirmatively, a commercial speech
regulation will be upheld, the Court said, if it directly advances the asserted government interest
and is no more extensive than necessary to achieve that interest. Id.
225 FSPTCA, supra note 13, § 2.
226 Id. § 2(31).
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[N]arrowly tailored to restrict those advertising and promotional
practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by youth and most
likely to entice them into tobacco use, while affording tobacco
manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to convey information
about their products to adult consumers.227
Commercial speech rendered false or misleading by the use of photographs,
illustrations, logos, color, or sound effects would receive no First Amendment
protection under the first prong of Central Hudson.228 Under the second, third, and
fourth prongs, however, Congress could permissibly address a substantial public
health interest in restraining tobacco use by a particular group, in this case, youth
tobacco use, by banning the types of color, pictorial, audio, or audio-visual tobacco
advertisements to which youths were demonstrably susceptible.229 However, the
effect of, for example, the blanket tombstone advertising format, which may be
described as the closest analogue to plain packaging required by the FSPTCA, was
far-reaching and encompassed even non-misleading color, pictorial, audio, or audiovisual tobacco advertisements and banned even those designed to appeal to adults.230
One might observe that such tombstone advertising and labeling formats required
under the law would likely fail the Central Hudson test due to insufficient
tailoring.231
Applying the above reasoning to plain packaging, the outcome would likely be
similar. Smoking is legal, so under the first step of a Central Hudson analysis,
tobacco companies’ commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment,
provided that it is not false or misleading.232 The second Central Hudson step may be
satisfied if the government asserts a public health interest in preventing tobacco use
that the Supreme Court declared “substantial, and even compelling” in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.233 The constitutionality of restrictions arising from plain
packaging, e.g., marketing restrictions, may therefore hinge on the third and fourth
Central Hudson steps: whether the restriction will alleviate real harm to a material

227 supra note 13, § 2(32). The scope of FDA authority to regulate tobacco under the FSPTCA
is severely circumscribed compared to the agency’s authority to regulate other products under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, reflecting the influence of the tobacco industry on the legislation, as
James O’Reilly has explained. JAMES O’REILLY, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 29 (West, 3d ed.
Supp. 2007).
228 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
229 Id.; In re Tobacco Cases I, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 318–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
the images in the tobacco advertisement, even though they were not hand drawn, were “cartoons”
under the master settlement’s definition, and thus prohibited); People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 327–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the cigarette
company violated the master settlement agreement by willfully ignoring that its advertisements
reached youths at the same level as that of young adults).
230 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001) (holding that certain FDA
regulations violated the narrow tailoring prong because they failed to target “particular advertising
and promotion practices that appeal to youth . . . while permitting others”).
231 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d. 509, 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
232 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
233 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564.
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degree,234 and whether Congress narrowly tailored the restriction to achieve the
asserted health objective.235
One important inquiry into plain packaging legislation is the degree to which it
in fact restricts marketing, i.e., advertising and promotional speech practices.236 This
begs an inquiry into two facets—one practical and one analytical. In relation to the
former, Australia can be viewed as a “test-case” in providing some indication about
the scope of restriction. A determination such as this would be of primary relevance
in defining an appropriate level of compensation, i.e., “just compensation,” in a claim
under the Fifth Amendment.237 As stated above, however, there may be sufficient
scope to argue that the “purposive elements” of “justice and fairness” may not ever
truly justify economic injuries.238 In this sense, what truly amounts to “just
compensation” in the context of plain packaging legislation remains moot. Further, it
may be observed that invoking the Fifth Amendment may strengthen an argument
seeking to establish a breach, either partially or wholly, of the First Amendment.
The rationale for this boils down to the cause, or need, for “just compensation” in lieu
of establishing an exception to the contrary, and, in this regard, the requisite nexus
between deprivation, i.e., encumbrance over or taking, of private property and
deprivation of commercial speech.239
Such an inquiry may require an analysis of a question framed earlier in this
paper: the scope of “use . . . in the course of trade” under TRIPS Article 20. This
would require a legislature to carefully frame such legislation to distinguish between
use or a restriction or “taking” of a mark, i.e., an encumbrance over a property right,
in the course of trade, or an encumbrance affecting marketing and the underlying
product in the course of trade.
Even if plain packaging legislation impacts the First Amendment rights of
manufacturers and retailers to convey, and of consumers to receive, truthful
information about legal products, it may do so only to the extent necessary to achieve
the government’s demonstrated interest.
Not even a compelling interest in
preventing tobacco use to protect the public health would be able to justify tobacco
advertising and labeling restrictions so broad that they nearly foreclose tobacco
companies’ ability to derive benefit from marketing campaigns, if plain packaging in
fact warrants this.
This view presents an argument placing a nail in the coffin for a constitutionally
valid plain packaging legislation in the United States—for now at least. If Congress
did consider introducing such a statute, it would be wise to undertake the requisite
calculus demanded by the First Amendment.

Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 535.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
236 See Alberto Alemanno, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 197, 231–32 (2012).
237 See generally supra Part III.C.
238 Id.
239 Davison, supra note 20, at 21.
234
235
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Thus far, most doctrinal contributions on the subject of tobacco plain packaging
have concentrated on the interaction between tobacco control and trade, and the
nexus between tobacco control and investment treaty guarantees. Little, however,
has been written on the interplay between public-right and private property right
recognition under constitutional mandates and on the nexus with international
treaties. This article has examined the approaches to plain packaging legislation in
two distinct, but relatively active, jurisdictions with respect to the role of health
policy as a public-oriented right: Australia and the United States through the
medium of constitutional and international mandates. In particular, this paper has
identified conceded arguments, both on normative and legal premises, to adequately
challenge and reinforce the validity of certain legislation introducing plain packaging
laws.
Further, this paper highlighted the interplay between constitutional provisions,
normative arguments with respect to the trademark regime, and certain articles in
the TRIPS Agreement. Therein, some common challenges remain at issue. For
instance, inherent within the object of trademark protection is a dichotomy between
property rights considerations and other external values such as free speech,
competition, and public health. This dichotomy is played out in determining whether
tobacco plain packaging legislation is constitutionally valid and simultaneously
compliant with international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and Paris
Convention. This paper identified the normative facets of property rights in the
trademark regime and suggested that the position taken by Australia, and the WTO
recently, indicates a trend toward recognition of property rights in trademarks in the
context of tobacco plain packaging laws. This development is consistent with the
traditional purpose of trademark law—to improve the quality of information in the
marketplace.
At the same time, it is submitted that future interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, Paris Convention, and constitutional provisions should proceed along a
purposive approach as identified in this paper, which requires an understanding of
the respective objectives and normative themes. The importance of understanding
the normative perspectives of trademark rights is reflected in the normative
perspective’s ability to articulate the meaning of “use” of proprietary rights for the
purposes of Articles 6 quinquies, 7, 8, and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement and its ability
to answer whether plain packaging legislation amounts to a “taking” or an
“acquisition” of property rights contrary to Constitutional mandates. If so, it must
also address whether such a “taking” or “acquisition” is justified on the basis of “just
terms” or being “fair and equitable.” Again, the nature of the property, including
rights, and its source, have been identified as factors for this determination. As this
paper highlights, the nature of the property, i.e., right or interest, is to be construed
as separate to the “good” to which that right may attach.
It is also submitted that such a purposive approach may provide a greater
ability to identify the emphasis to be placed on public rights. With respect to the
“nature” of property rights, the High Court alluded to an important distinction
between Australia and approaches taken in other countries, including the United
States. It was identified that while intellectual property laws create property rights,
the scope of these rights may be dependent upon whether the rights are recognized
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as being “instrumental” in character—the recognition of which differs from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.240 An understanding of the scope of being “instrumental
in character,” therefore, is central to understanding the relevance of constitutional
mandates for the purposes of determining the constitutional validity of plain
packaging legislation.241 It was identified that such rights are, in Australia at least,
based on their instrumental character, inherently susceptible to variation, and
therefore outside the ambit of section 51(xxxi). Rather, there are, and always have
been, “purposive elements” reflecting public policy considerations that inform the
statutory creation of intellectual property rights.242 This is unlike the position in the
United States, where such purposive elements in determining the scope of property
are subordinate to the relative requirements of, for example, the underlying
objectives of the First and Fifth Amendments. In the event that the United States
seeks to introduce plain packaging legislation, and on the assumption that a “taking
of property” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment could be established, there may
exist sufficient scope to argue that the purposive elements of “justice and fairness”
may not ever truly justify economic injuries.243
Similarly, this paper identified the importance of understanding that the right’s
“instrumental character” exists in the context of its correlation with establishing an
“encumbrance” for the purpose of TRIPS Article 20. Even then, only “the use of a
trademark in the course of trade” is relevant for the purposes of assessing the
legality of an “encumbrance by special requirements” under Article 20.244 Yet there
are many grounds to argue that plain packing legislation exists outside the course of
trade.245 The High Court’s rejection to characterizing the TPPA as a “law of trade
regulation,” placing it outside the application of section 51(xxxi), albeit in the context
of acquisition of property, implicitly supports this view.246 If this were the case, then
WTO Members would have an unhindered right to encumber trademarks outside the
course of trade.247 In short, the encumbrances on word trademarks in the course of
trade that are imposed by plain packaging legislation are relatively small, but have
the effect of assisting to achieve health objectives outside the course of trade.248
Nevertheless, this paper highlighted the scope of conceded arguments that
purport to challenge plain packaging under the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris
Convention.
It remains doubtful that plain packaging legislation could be
invalidated, either wholly or partially, under international treaties.249 This paper
notes the importance of articulating the role of health policy, i.e., broader publicrights, when seeking to “restrict,” impede, or encumber private-rights—although it
recommends that this be undertaken in the context of a purposive approach. It is
240 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶¶ 28–30 (Austl.); see also DRAHOS,
supra note 161, at 220.
241 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (Cth) (2012) HCA 43, ¶ 30 (Austl.).
242 Id.
243 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
244 Davison, supra note 57, at 10–11.
245 Id. at 21.
246 Trade Practices Comm’n v Tooth & Co. Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 428 (Austl.).
247 Davison, supra note 57, at 21.
248 Id.
249 Davison, supra note 57, at 2.
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recognized that governments tend to maintain a certain level of discretion in their
ability to “modify,” “impede,” or, to a degree, “create” certain “rights” and/or
obligations in legislation. However, such discretion must be qualified against certain
constitutional rights and requirements, not to mention core objectives of a particular
legal regime. One point that remains unsettled, however, is whether striking a
balance between private-rights and public-rights from an international perspective,
to procure the “spirit” of the TRIPS and from a domestic perspective to align with
Constitutional mandates, is achievable any time soon.
Governments or States seeking to introduce, challenge, or invoke the potential
invalidity of plain packaging legislation should first consider the merits of the
arguments identified in this paper. The arguments presented would also be relevant
to legislators seeking to introduce laws governing plain packaging in other heavily
regulated industries, such as the fast food and alcohol industries. It is likely that
intellectual property holders within these markets will be watching developments
with close interest. Whether the United States and the European Union will follow
the lead of Australia within the current legislative climate is open to doubt, but this
does not invalidate Australia’s action nor necessarily require that the tobacco
companies could or should triumph. For now, we must conclude that establishing a
case successfully challenging the validity of plain packaging on domestic and
international fora could be as difficult as changing tobacco policies in the first place.

